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Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights?, 12 J. CRIM.
L. &-CRIMINOLOGY 839 (1921); People v. Lewis, supra.
Nonlawyers generally favor eliminating technicalities from
juvenile court proceedings. Realization of the ideals widely cherished for staffing juvenile courts with judges and social investigators
would perhaps make a completely informal procedure desirable.
Good results are more likely to be obtained thus than by bringing
minors into a formal and ceremonious court where the suggestion
is that the law is about to be invoked to punish hardened malefactors. State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 167 N.W. 830 (1918). The
practice of private hearings before judges with practically uncontrolled discretion, however, has been criticized somewhat extravagantly as modern Star Chamber proceedings. Note, 27 COL. L. REV.
968 (1927).
Wigmore concludes that logically and practically juvenile
courts are not bound in law to observe jury trial rules of evidence.
I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §4d (4) (3d ed. 1940). Modern statutes allow admission of hearsay testimony. Ga. Laws 1943, No. 203, p. 628,
§ 4; R. I. Laws 1944, c. 1441, § 24.
By the instant case the Pennsylvania court has achieved the
same result without specific statutory provisions. The result may
be desirable, but most courts have been reluctant to anticipate the
legislature in reaching it.
H. C. B.

REAL PROPERTY-CONTRACT TO PURCHASE-HUSBAND AND WIFE.

-P, as joint purchaser with her husband under a contract to buy a
tract of land, brought suit after she was divorced, joining her
former husband and the vendors of the land, to compel execution
of a deed to her of an interest in the land equivalent to one-half of
the amount of the purchase money paid during coverture. The
final payments of the purchase price had been made after the
divorce and the vendors were doubtful as to whom the property
should be conveyed as between husband and wife. Held, that
where husband and wife join in a written agreement to purchase
land and to pay the price therefore in installments, and are divorced
prior to payment of the entire purchase price, no settlement of
their property rights having been made in the divorce suit, the
former wife is entitled to only one-half of the total amount of such
installments paid before the divorce and has no property interest
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in the land itself. Everly v. Schoemer, 80 S.E.2d 334 (W. Va. 1954).
It is clear under the West Virginia decisions that had the deed
been executed to husband and wife before the divorce, it would
have been presumed a gift to the wife of a moiety of the property
even though she contributed no money toward the purchase price.
She would have been vested with full legal and equitable title to
such interest, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.
Edwards v. Edwards, 117 W. Va. 505, 185 S.E. 904 (1936). The
court in the instant case recognized that "the principle relating
to a gift by a husband to a wife is applicable to this suit." However, the court refused to allow a gift to the wife of a moiety of
the property as was done in the Edwards case and allowed only a
sum of money equivalent to such moiety on the ground that no
conveyance had been made.
The question that naturally arises is how can any payment
of the purchase price result in any sort of a gift of money to the
wife, when such money is given over to the vendors as payment of
the purchase price in the name of the wife and husband as joint
purchasers of the land? The money upon being paid to the
vendors became irrevocably the property of such vendors in payment of the land. It would seem that, even though no conveyance
was made giving the wife a legal moiety of the land as in the
Edwards case, she would have an equitable title to the land held
jointly with her husband under the familiar theory of equitable
conversion upon the signing of the purchase contract. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284 (4th Cir. 1909).

The court did not mention the possibility of the wife having
any such property interest in the land. It may, however, have had
this problem in mind when it referred to W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 15,
§ 2 (Michie, 1949), which confers jurisdiction on a court of equity
in divorce cases to "make any order or decree concerning the
estate of the parties, or either of them as it shall deem expedient."
It is true that the present case was in effect a delayed property
settlement under a divorce, but "this statute also, clearly contemplates a restoration of the property in kind to the party entitled
thereto, and not a money recovery for the value thereof." Wood
v. Wood, 126 W. Va. 189, 28 S.E. 423 (1943). Therefore, if P
was entitled to a property interest in the land, it seems that such
interest should not be erased and a sum of money be substituted.
As mentioned, the court did not even discuss the possibility of the
wife's having an equitable interest in the land, so no authority is
cited for extinguishing such a right if one in fact existed. It is ver
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doubtful if the case can be considered stare decisis as to the respective rights and interests of spouses as joint purchasers before a
conveyance of the land to them. After a conveyance is completed,
the Edwards case would control in giving each an equal moiety of
the land.
However, one commendable result of the decision is that, as
P was decreed to have no property interest in the land, a probable
future partition suit with her former husband was avoided. Likewise, the value of the land itself apparently had not increased since
the divorce, so that a moiety of the purchase price paid was approximately as valuable to P as a proportional moiety of the land
itself would have been.
C. B. F.

TAXATION - LIENs - PiuomuTis.-Proceeding under the Ohio
wrongful death statute, the administrator attached cash and bonds
belonging to taxpayer. Thereafter a lien for unpaid federal income taxes arose against taxpayer, and still later, the attaching
claimant reduced his claim to judgment. In a suit to collect taxpayer's unpaid taxes, it was stipulated that the only issue was the
relative priority of the attachment lien and the federal tax lien.
Held, that a tax lien of the United States is prior in right to an
attachment lien where the federal tax lien arose and was recorded
prior to the date the attaching creditor obtained judgment,
though subsequent to the date of the attachment lien. United
States v. Acri, 75 Sup. Ct. 239 (1955); Accord, United States v.
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 247 (1955)
(garnishment lien); United States v. Scovil, 75 Sup. Ct. 244 (1955)
(landlord's distress lien).
The Supreme Court based the above decisions upon the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien. This doctrine requires a
lien, before it can prevail over a federal tax lien, to be specific
and perfected. To understand the above cases and the doctrine
applied by them, one must look at certain statutes and cases preceding them.
About the time of the Civil War, Congress passed a statute that,
while granting first priority to the government as a creditor, created
no lien. Rzv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1946). This
statute was only available in the case of an insolvent debtor whose
property had passed to a third person (other than a trustee in
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